We are not a jump shot team!
Now let’s look at the performance aspect. 안전 메이저놀이터 The difference from the 2010s during the dynasty is the main scoring path.
*¹It used to be a clear jump-shooting team (+transition play).
In particular, after the recruitment of superstar Durant above the superstar, the mid-range pull-up jump shot-based production peaked.
As a group with the Splash Brothers, where Curry and Thompson were united, their dependence on the three-point line was also high.
This can be seen in the table of changes in the percentage of field-attempt attempts by region for the final season playoffs below.
This year’s playoffs stimulate the nostalgia for the 2014-16 season model, ‘Original Golden State.
‘ Compared to the 2019 playoffs, the last season with Durant, the percentage of mid-range field throw attempts (MFGA%) decreased by -9.0%.
Instead, the attack is centered on the paint zone and the three-point line, just like when Andrew Bogot and others ate together.
The 45.9% of the paint zone’s you trial share (PFGA%) exceeded 45.2% in the 2015 playoffs, the starting point of the construction of the dynasty.
*²From the opponent’s defense point of view, the Splash Brothers’ three-point line movement check is not an option; it’s a necessity.
However, the eyes of the Golden State players are towards the rim. Therefore, it means a flexible scoring path without pushing too hard on the defensive focus point.
In addition, the opponent’s defense is less dependent on an intuitive pick-and-roll play that is easy to predict.
The share of pick & roll ball handler play of 14.1% compared to the total play type is the lowest among the four teams that made it to the conference finals this year (MIA 19.7%, DAL 19.1%, BOS 16.1%, GSW 14.1%).
Consider the playoff map flow.
*³Literally killer pick-and-roll counter punches dot the court.
Most teams put all their energy into defending the ball handler. In the case of Golden State, it bypasses the defensive focus by rim pick-and-roll roll-man play, cut-in play, 메이저놀이터 주소 etc.
Who defines them as jump-shooting teams?
Like the ‘Original Golden State,’ it was redesigned as a group that can score points in all court areas.
The cut-in play perfection is the greatest weapon. The average of 12.6 attempts per playoff game and 17.1 points per play-based play are all generously ranked first.
A Points Per Possession of 1.36 is also good.
A type that is difficult to utilize due to high expectations for scoring.
It will be established only when all five players on the court thoroughly digest the pre-determined movement.
As you know, motion-based 4:4-5:5 play cannot be imitated by anyone.
What if the offensive side develops in the desired direction?
*⁴The defense side will allow conceding even though they know it.
It is in the same vein that the pass game productivity is excellent 오래된 메이저놀이터.
Superior scoring power is guaranteed without a specific handler holding the ball long.
Average of 281.6 passes per playoff game 5th overall in the league, 15th in possession time per ball touch of 3.02 seconds, and 1st in share (ATP%/ADJ) with 12.6% passes linked to adjusted assists.
It can be seen that the shooting system linked with quick decision-making is operating smoothly.
You can’t set a focus point if your opponent’s defense is good! Let’s take an example.
When Curry plays an on-ball or off-ball screen-based movement, the opponent’s defense focuses on the best jump shooter.
What is noteworthy here is that Golden State’s options for passing and shooting games are limitless.
The green-focused handoff play, Rooney’s pick-and-roll Rollman play, and Wiggins and Thompson’s flair screen-based moving to the position are not focused on the ace scorer.
Of course, a tax (?) says that mistakes are made one after another due to complicated linkage, but there is no problem at all since the income exceeds the tax.
The Offensive Rating (ORtg) number 116.1, which means the expectation of scoring in 100 attack opportunities for the Golden Warriors Corps, is 1st out of 16 teams in the playoffs.
*¹ Charles Barkley said during the 2015 playoffs, “A jump shot team can’t win.” Of course, I was ranting, but I was in trouble.
*² Sometimes putting the 3-point line offensive first. This is when the opponent focuses on defending the space behind the second-three line. This explains why Golden State can take different attack styles depending on the opposing defense. There are plenty of offensive court options.
*³ Dallas also crushed the Phoenix attack with intense front-to-back pressure during the second round of the Western Conference playoffs. However, it did not work against Golden State, which excelled in versatility.
*⁴ Golden State Playoff Restricted Area (RESTRICTED AREA) 72.5% field throw success rate 3rd overall in the league, 1st out of 4 teams that advanced to the conference finals
Golden State’s recent finals season PO changes in fielding attempts by the region
2015: PFGA% 45.2% MFGA% 18.6% 3PA% 36.2%
2016: PFGA% 44.4% MFGA% 17.7% 3PA% 37.9%
2017: PFGA% 41.5% MFGA% 20.7% 3PA% 37.8%
2018: PFGA% 39.8% MFGA% 23.7% 3PA% 36.5%
2019: PFGA% 40.4% MFGA% 21.6% 3PA% 38.0%
2022: PFGA% 45.9% MFGA% 12.6% 3PA% 41.5%
*PFGA%/MFGA%/3PA%: Share of each paint zone/mid-range area/3-point line field throw attempts compared to the total field throw attempts
Comparison of cut-in play productivity of the four teams that advanced to the PO Conference Finals 메이저놀이터 목록
GSW: 12.6 attempts (1st place) 17.1 points (1st place) PPP 1.36 points (4th place)
DAL: 3.3 attempts (16th place) 4.3 points (15th place) PPP 1.31 points (7th place)
MIA: 7.6 attempts (6th place) 9.8 points (5th place) PPP 1.28 points (11th place)
BOS: 6.3 attempts (11th place) 9.2 points (7th place) PPP 1.47 points (2nd place)
*In parentheses ( ) are the rankings based on the 16 teams that advanced to the PO.
*PPP: Points Per Possession. Scoring expectations per possession in that play
Comparison of game productivity with the four teams that advanced to the PO conference finals
GSW: 281.6 passes (5th place) SPT 3.02 seconds (15th place) AST% 66.9% (1st place) ATP%/ADJ 12.6% (1st place)
DAL: Pass 256.1 (11th) SPT 3.64 sec (1st) AST% 52.8% (15th) ATP%/ADJ 9.6% (12th)
MIA: 277.2 passes (7th) SPT 3.21 seconds (12th) AST% 58.4% (9th) ATP%/ADJ 9.8% (8th)
BOS: 284.6 passes (3rd place) SPT 3.23 seconds (11th place) AST% 65.6% (2nd place) ATP%/ADJ 10.5% (5th place)
*In parentheses ( ) are the rankings based on the 16 teams that advanced to the PO.
*SPT: avg Sec Per Touch. Retention time per ball touch
*AST%: Occupational share of assists compared to successful field shots
*ATP%/ADJ: Ast To Pass%/ADJustment. Occupancy with Passes Linked to Coordinating Assists
learn from failure
The 2019 playoff final is a memory they want to erase for Golden State fans.
*¹The team that boasted excellent firepower against Cleveland in the 2017-18 Finals backed up in vain against Toronto, which they met in 2019. Even if you consider the variable of departure from the main gun Durant injury, let’s look.
First, Nick Nulls’ 2018-19 season Toronto revolutionized the defense system.
By mobilizing all the defense methods listed in basketball textbooks, such as Box & One, he defeated the difficult enemies Philadelphia (Eastern Conference 2R), Milwaukee (CF), and Golden State (F).
In particular, the use of the ever-changing regional defense left a clear impression.
Moreover, it was a time when another change occurred in the flow of the league, which focused on building the *² switch system.
Golden State manager Steve Kerr 사설토토 메이저놀이터 https://wbjpens.com is being re-evaluated in this year’s playoffs is simple.
Despite being a leader who has had massive success with his system, he has been sensitive to changes in the flow of the league.
Let’s take a look at the defense system of the Golden Warriors Corps.
I had a lot of fun with the switch-included man-to-man and changed the defensive formation in the right place. It is an active benchmarking without burying the pain experienced in 2019.
Against Dallas, which we met on the battlefield of the Conference Finals, the defense of the rim protection area, the reason that covered Curry and Pool, which are vulnerable to the one-to-many matchup, and the offensive, defensive maneuver following the acquisition of *³possession shone. This reminds me of Toronto’s 2019 championship journey.
His superior board grip is also a plus. We made up for the weakness of the small lineup-based rotation operation with a sincere box-out.
The rebound share (TRB) of the regular season’s best five-person lineup was 53.8%, and the figure corresponding to the playoff best five-person lineup was also 57.9%.
*⁴Completion of good defense faithfully kept the thesis of rebounding.
Also, a team with stable defensive rebounds can switch to early offense.
Will there be a team of extreme defensive idiots on the playoff stage of the top-notch competition?
Transition play is the easiest way to bypass the opponent’s tough defense.
One of Golden State’s most robust windows, transition play-based scoring, starts with defensive rebounds.
Briefly summarized, it is a playoff journey in 2022 that emphasizes the strengthening of motion offense-based strengths in attack, active benchmarking in defense, and complementary rebounding competitiveness.
*¹ Gold State 2017 Finals vs CLE ORtg 120.4 (margin +6.1), 2018 Finals vs CLE ORtg 122.8 (margin +17.3) -> 2019 Finals vs TOR ORtg 109.3 (margin –5.6)
*² To put it bluntly, Houston’s banner for the 2017-18 season was an all-switch system-based ‘anti-golden state.’
*³ However, the competitiveness of Golden State’s counterattack situation is inferior compared to the 2010s during the dynasty. It has something to do with Draymond Green’s aging.
*⁴ A firm grip on the board helps prevent second chance runs.
Golden State Season & PO Best Lineup Defensive Index 메이저놀이터 순위
Curry + Pool + Wiggins + Green + Rooney (347 minutes): DRtg 104.0 TRB% 53.8% FG 44.3%
Curry + Thompson + Wiggins + Green + Rooney (105 minutes): DRtg 101.4 TRB% 57.9% FG 39.5%
*DRtg: Expectation to conceded in 100 defensive opportunities
*TRB%: Rebound share
Golden State 2019 vs. 2022 PO Rebound Competitiveness Change
2019: ORB% 30.1% DRB% 71.4% Second chance 13.7 runs (margin +0.7 points)
2022: ORB% 28.2% DRB% 74.1% Second chance 12.7 runs (margin +1.8 points)
*ORB%/DRB%: Occupational share of attack/defense rebounds, respectively